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LEGISLATION
be wise to utilize the corporate entity by having the stockholder sell
his stock to the corporation and then buy stock that qualifies under
section 1244 directly from the corporation.
A stockholder in a family corporation may be able to establish
an ordinary loss on 1244 stock and still keep the stock within the
family by selling to in-laws.67 Needless to say, the sale must be
bona fide.
In view of the benefits of section 1244 and other provisions of
the Technical Amendments Act of 1958,68 it would appear that the
future trend in small business organization should 'be and will be
towards conducting business in the corporate form.
M
RECENT CHANGES IN FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Introduction
Congress has recently passed an Act amending the statutory
provisions in regard to jurisdiction of the federal courts. The amount
in controversy in "federal question" and "diversity of citizenship"
cases has been increased,' and for purposes of diversity jurisdiction
corporations are now deemed "citizens" both of their state of incor-
poration and of the state in which they have their "principal place
of business." 2 Also, workmen's compensation cases arising under
7 IBP, Tax Planning § 2, at 5 (Aug. 27, 1958).
6sFor example, corporations may now elect more beneficial tax treatment
under INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, subchapter S, §§ 1371-77.
'Passed July 25, 1958, this amendment provides for four significant
changes in diversity jurisdiction provisions. The first stipulates that the
"amount in controversy" in diversity cases be in excess of $10,000, exclusive
of interest and costs. Formerly, the amount was in excess of $3,000, exclu-
sive of interest and costs. This provision of the amendment is reinforced
by the further provision that, if the plaintiff be adjudged entitled to recover
less than $10,000, without regard to any counterclaim, the district court may,
in its discretion, deny costs to him or even, in addition, impose costs upon
him. 72 STAT. 415 (1958), amending 62 STAT. 930 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32
(1952). The amendment raises the amount in controversy in "federal question7'
cases to in excess of $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs, but this provision
is regarded by Congress as relatively minor. See S. RE:'. No. 1830, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1958) : "While this bill applies the $10,000 minimum limitation to
cases involving Federal questions, its effect will be greater on diversity cases
since many of the so-called Federal question cases will be exempt from its
provision. This is for the reason that Federal courts are expressly given orig-
inal jurisdiction without limitation as to the amount claimed in a great many
areas of Federal Law. For example, regardless of the amount claimed, the
Federal courts have jurisdiction in copyright, patent, and trademark cases."
2 72 STAT. 415 (1958), amending 62 STAT. 930 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32
(1952).
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state law cannot be removed to federal courts.3 The avowed purpose
of this amendment is to reduce the case load in the federal courts,
and so promote the efficient administration of justice.4 Such an
enactment was vitally necessary-the federal courts are swamped with
unfinished business, and this backlog of cases increases each year.3
One of the principal causes of congestion is the large number of cases
involving state law which stream into the federal courts through the
diversity of citizenship jurisdictional device." It is this source of
calendar congestion which Congress has principally sought to
diminish.
Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship was conferred
upon the federal courts because of the fear that state courts would
exhibit prejudice toward non-resident litigants." As Justice Story
said in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee:
The constitution has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire)
that state, attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests,
might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control,
the regular administration of justice. . . . No other reason than that which
has been stated can be assigned, why some, at least, of those cases should not
have been left to the cognizance of the state courts.8
Perhaps the underlying cause of this presumption was the economic
disparity between the various sections of the country: the Northeast
was highly developed; the frontier and South were rather poor. It
was felt that the Northeast, with its large accumulations of capital,
would be the "creditor" section, and that the frontier and South
would be "debtor" sections. Many feared that in these "debtor" sec-
tions, there would be hostility toward the "creditors," and that this
hostility would give rise to discriminatory attitudes in state courts.
Consequently, the flow of capital between the "creditor" and "debtor"
sections would be inhibited because of fear on the part of investors
that they would sustain losses through injustice. The economic de-
velopment of large parts of the country would thereby be hindered.9
As Henry Friendly stated in his informative article:
3 72 STAT. 415 (1958), amending 62 STAT. 939 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §'1445
(1952). Texas, Alabama, and New Mexico had received a substantial number
of such cases by removal, and Louisiana some of them. S. REP. No. 1830,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1958).
4 See S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958).
5 Ibid. See also 1957 U.S. JuD. CoNF. ANN. REP'. 75.
6 See 1957 U.S. JuD. CoF. ANN. REP. 75.
7 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 3 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (dictum).
8 Id. at 347.
1 See Brown, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Cousts Based on Diversity
of Citisenship, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 179, 180-83 (1929); Friendly, The Historic
Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REv. 483, 497-99 (1928).
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Not unnaturally the commercial interests of the country were reluctant to
expose themselves to the hazards of litigation before [the state courts] ...
They might be good enough for the inhabitants of their respective states, but
merchants from abroad felt themselves entitled to something better. There
was a vague feeling that the [federal] courts would be strong courts, creditors'
courts, business men's courts. 10
But there are doubts as to the validity of the "debtor-creditor hos-
tility" theory. Friendly observed that:
Only if we could find that the state judges had been notoriously unfair to
foreigners, would we be in a position to place much faith in the genuineness of
the classical theory.']
He went on to state that there is no evidence available to support
this position,12 but other writers disagreed.'2
However the question of the validity of the original basis for
diversity jurisdiction be resolved, there still remains the question of
the justification for its retention at the present time. One writer
asserted in 1929 that there was still a large amount of "debtor-
creditor hostility." He pointed out that sectionalism was still
rampant, and that the economic disparity between the sections had
not been eliminated. 14  Hence, while federal district courts may well
have judges and juries drawn from the locality, since these judges
are federal officers there is a tendency to diminish the unfortunate
effect of local prejudice.15 Brown had advanced another theory
in support of diversity jurisdiction. He indicated that the doctrine
of Swift z. Tyson 1 tended toward the conformity of state law with
federal law, and that this unifying force justified the retention of the
jurisdiction.1 7 Whatever degree of validity this theory may have had,
it has been moot since the decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,'
8
which required adherence in federal courts to state decisional law as
well as statutory law.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, however, takes the position that fear of
local prejudice is belied by the changes in our national economic
10 Friendly, supra note 9, at 498.
11 Id. at 493.
12 Id. at 493-97.
13 See Yntema & Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction,
79 U. PA. L. Ruv. 869, 876-77 n.13 (1931).
14 Brown, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Based on Diversity of
Citizenship, 78 U. PA. L. Rav. 179, 181-83 (1929). See also Newlin, Proposed
Limitations Upon Federal Courts, 15 A.B.A.J. 401, 403-04 (1929) ; Parker, The
Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It, 18 A.B.A.J. 433, 437-39
(1932); Parker, Dual Sovereignty and the Federal Courts, 51 Nw. U.L. REv.
407, 408-13 (1956). But see discussion in Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction
and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEmSP. PROB. 216, 235-36
(1948).
15 Brown, supra note 14, at 183-86.
16 14 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
17 Brown, supra note 14, at 191.
18 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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structure, which "no longer allows the easy assumption that in the
West and in the South state jurors and judges are economic
Ishmaelites." 19 This would seem to indicate that it is by no means
clear that there is justification for retention of diversity jurisdiction.
Conversely, its opponents have not conclusively demonstrated that it
lacks justification. However the controversy may be resolved in the
future, the present amendment does not abolish diversity jurisdiction;
it merely modifies it.20 Congress has not inquired into the raison
d'6tre of the jurisdiction, but has simply endeavored to remove a few
of its deleterious effects on the federal administration of justice.21
The federal court calendars have, in recent years, become seri-
ously congested. The number of private civil cases rose from 33,519
in 1956 to 36,938 in 1957, an increase of ten per cent.22 In 1956, of
the private civil cases, 20,525, or approximately two-thirds, were in
the federal courts because of diversity of citizenship. 23 In 1957, the
number of diversity cases rose to 23,223, accounting again for about
two-thirds of the private civil business. 24
The huge increase in the case load of the federal courts has had
its effect. In the Eastern District of New York in 1957, the average
interval between filing a case and its disposition was more than forty-
six months. 25 It is safe to state that if the number of diversity cases
could be decreased, this interval would be shortened.
The Supreme Court held in Marbury v. Madison 26 that Con-
gress may not extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond
the boundaries prescribed in the Constitution; however, it may refuse
to vest in them the various types of jurisdiction enumerated.2 7 The
constitutional provisions for jurisdiction are permissive, and not
mandatory.28  As the Supreme Court stated in Kline v. Burke
Constr. Co.: 29
The right of a litigant to maintain an action in a federal court on the ground
that there is a controversy between citizens of different States is not . . .
derived from the Constitution.... Only the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
is derived directly from the Constitution. Every other court created by the
general government derives its jurisdiction wholly from the authority of
19 Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power between United States and
State Courts, 13 CoRmELL L.Q. 499, 522 (1928).2 0 See 72 STAT. 415 (1958).
21 Cf. S. Rm,. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1958).
22 1957 U.S. Jtr. CONF. ANN. RP. 75.
2
3 Id. at 174.24Ibid. Of these, only 6,059 were removed from state courts. The re-
maining three-fourths of the diversity cases were brought directly in federal
courts by the plaintiffs. Ibid.
25 1957 U.S. JUD. CONF. ANN. REP. 115.
26 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
27 See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 17 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1849) ; U.S. v. Hudson
& Goodwin, 2 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
28 See note 27, supra.
29 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
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Congress. That body may give, withhold or restrict such jurisdiction at its
discretion. . . .30
Therefore, no constitutional problem should arise in regard to the
amount in controversy provisions.
(a) Dual Citizenship of Corporations
There may be some doubt as to the constitutionality of the pro-
vision by which a corporation is deemed a citizen of the state in which
it has its principal place of business, as well as of the state in which
it is incorporated. It is a well settled doctrine that a corporation is
deemed to be a citizen of the state of incorporation, for purposes of
diversity of citizenship. 3' However, this doctrine is but a statement
of a fiction, since a corporation is not as a rule regarded as a citizen 3 2
The Supreme Court has held that Congress may extend diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction to cases involving inhabitants of the District
of Columbia and of the Territories,33 in spite of the classic holding
of Chief Justice Marshall that the District could not be considered
a "state" within the terms of Article III of the Constitution.34 By
this amendment Congress seems to run counter to the long line of
Supreme Court decisions holding that a corporation is only the crea-
ture of the state in which it was incorporated and deemed to be a
"citizen" of that state alone.3" Here a corporation may in effect be
a citizen of more than one state. But this provision is for the pur-
pose of limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts in diversity of
citizenship cases, and not for the purpose of extending it. It may,
therefore, be legitimately contended that since Congress has the power
to withhold or restrict such jurisdiction, the amendment is a valid one.
Under this amendment, a corporation created by the laws of
state A, having its principal place of business in state B, cannot claim
diversity of citizenship as a ground for federal jurisdiction if it sues
a citizen of state B. Neither can a citizen of state B claim diversity
of citizenship, wherever he may sue. Also, where a corporation is
incorporated in more than one state,36 it will be considered a citizen
30 Id. at 233-34.
31 Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933) ; Doctor v. Harrington,
196 U.S. 579 (1905); Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 195 U.S. 207 (1904);
Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898); Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 21
U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853); Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v.
Letson, 15 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844). See also Green, Corporations as Per-
sons, Citizens, and Possessors of Liberties, 94 U. PA. L. REv. 202, 205-28
(1946).
3 See McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction, 56 HARV. L. REv. 853, 861
(1943).
33 National Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
34 Hepburn v. Ellzey, 1 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1804).
35 See note 31, .mpra.
36 Jacobson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 206 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 909 (1954). Cf. 28 U.S.C. 1348 (1952): Afl
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of the state in which it has its principal place of business as well as
of the states (however numerous) in which it is incorporated. Ac-
tions cannot be removed from state courts to federal courts in diversity
cases when the state court action is laid in the state where the foreign
corporation has its principal place of business.
(b) The "Principal Place of Business"
The cases construing the Federal Bankruptcy Act will very prob-
ably be determinative in the construction of the "principal place of
business" provision, according to the Report of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary.37 The Bankruptcy Act provides that the district
court of the district wherein the bankrupt has its "principal place of
business" has jurisdiction of the bankruptcy.38
Under the Bankruptcy Act, the question of the location of a
corporation's principal place of business is one of fact.39 Many cases
have dealt with this problem,40 and consequently a substantial body
of decisional law is available on the subject.
Among these cases is Dryden v. Ranger Refining and Pipe Line
Co.41 Involved there was a Delaware corporation, whose purpose
was to produce, refine, and sell petroleum and petroleum products.
Its "principal" office, according to its certificate of incorporation, was
in Delaware, where its stock books were kept. However, its "general
office" was in Kansas City, where its executive offices were located
and -all contracts were approved. There were some small oil wells
in Kansas, and one refinery, seven gas stations and some wells in
Missouri. The principal facilities of the company were in Texas:
two refineries, some of its pipe lines, and several wells. These facil-
ities contributed the bulk of the company's production. The value
of its Texas property was five times as great as that in Missouri.
Its Texas sales were more than four times as great as its Kansas
sales. The court held that the corporation's "principal place of
business" was in Texas.
national banking associations shall, for the purposes of all . . .actions by or
against them, be deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively
located."
37 S. RE,. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1958).
3866 STAT. 420, 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1952).
39 Chicago Bank of Commerce v. Carter, 61 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1932);
It re Diamond Star Timber Corp., 64 F. Supp. 849 (N.D.N.Y. 1946); In re
DeSoto Crude Oil Purchasing Corp., 35 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. La. 1940); In re
American & British Mfg. Corp., 300 Fed. 839 (D. Conn. 1924). Cf. In re
Pusey & Jones Co., 286 Fed. 88 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 623
(1923).
40 See note 39, supra. See also Continental Coal Corp. v. Roszelle Bros.,
242 Fed. 243 (6th Cir. 1917); Home Powder Co. v. Geis, 204 Fed. 568 (8th
Cir. 1913); In re Tygarts River Coal Co., 203 Fed. 178 (N.D.W. Va. 1913).
41280 Fed. 257 (5th Cir.), cert. dentied, 260 U.S. 726 (1922).
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Burdick v. Dillon 42 involved a somewhat different situation.
There, the "principal" office of a New Jersey corporation was in
Boston, Massachusetts, and most of its sales were transacted through
,that office, while its quarries and mills were in Vermont and New
York. The court held that the "principal place of business" was in
Massachusetts, where the office was located. The test was the "ordi-
nary understanding" of the principal place of business.
The court in the Dryden case, commenting on the Burdick case,
stated that:
The [Burdick] case sustains the view that the place where the corporation
conducts the greater part of its dealings with the public will be considered the
principal place of business of the corporation rather than an office for the
general control of its intra-corporate affairs.43
The court stated further that:
Where a corporation conducts its business in a number of places, no one of
which is plainly the place where its business is principally conducted, one of
such places, where a substantial business is transacted, and from which general
supervision of all of its business is exercised, may be properly held to be the
principal place of business of such corporation.44
Three factors were considered significant: the amount of production,
volume of sales, and value of property. The court also stated that
no general, set rule could be laid down. 45
It would seem that the three main factors mentioned in the
Dryden case will aid in determining the principal place of business.
However, where a corporation's facilities, conduct of operations, and
dealings with the public are distributed evenly in several states, as
may be the case with a railroad corporation, the location of the admin-
istrative office may be determinative.
Conclusion
The amendment will reduce the business of the federal courts,
but the extent is yet to be determined. The probable effect of the
provision by which a corporation is deemed to be a citizen both of
the state where incorporated and of that in which it has its principal
place of business is not known.46 In the Report of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary it is pointed out that corporations are parties
in sixty-two per cent of diversity cases.47  However, corporations
42 144 Fed. 737 (1st Cir. 1906).
43 Dryden v. Ranger Refining & Pipe Line Co., 280 Fed. 257, 262 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 726 (1922).
44 Id. at 262-63.
4 Id. at 263. See also Continental Coal Corp. v. Roszelle Bros., 242 Fed.
243 (6th Cir. 1917) ; Home Powder Co. v. Geis, 204 Fed. 568 (8th Cir. 1913);
It re Tygarts River Coal Co., 203 Fed. 178 (N.D.W. Va. 1913).
46 S, REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1958).47 Id. at 13.
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were not required to state their principal place of business prior to
this'amendment; consequently, it is not possible to estimate accurately
the number of cases which will be affected by this provision, other
than to speculate, as did Congress, that the number will be small but
substantial.48 The basis afforded for this speculation is a tabulation,
by clerks in five district courts, of cases involving corporations char-
tered outside the state where the district is located but with their
principal place of business in the state.49  The results of the tabulation
almost defy interpretation.50
The provision raising the minimum amount in controversy to
an amount in excess of 10,000 dollars, exclusive of interest and costs,
will have some effect in reducing the workload of the federal courts,
but this effect will not be great. As was stated in the Report of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary:
The number of diversity of citizenship cases, excluding tort actions, filed during
the 2 periods surveyed in which the amount in controversy did not exceed
$10,000 constitutes almost 40 percent of the total of such cases. This is im-
portant because the suits in this grouping are time consuming. However, a
reduction of 40 percent in the number of diversity of citizenship cases, other
than tort suits, filed in the district courts during the fiscal year 1956 would
have amounted to a reduction of only 6 percent in the total civil caseload. A
reduction of 5.5 percent in the number of diversity of citizenship personal
injury, motor-vehicle cases plus a reduction of 10 percent in all other diversity
of citizenship tort suits would have amounted to a decrease of about 2 percent
in the total civil caseload. Jones Act suits are not numerous so that a decline
of 2 to 3 percent in the number filed would not effect a significant change in
the overall civil caseload.5 1
The Committee concludes that:
On the basis of the available information it is therefore estimated that an
increase in the jurisdictional amount requisite to invoke the jurisdiction of the
United States district courts under diversity of citizenship or a Federal ques-
tion from $3,000 to $10,000 would have reduced the 1956 load of work in the
86 distridts which have only Federal jurisdiction by approximately 8 percent.52
48 Id. at 5, 14.4 9 Id. at 14.
5o The percentage of diversity cases involving corporations affected ranged
from none to 23%. Perhaps significant is the fact that a district in Michigan
had the highest percentage-23%. On the other hand Connecticut had 6%o,
Texas 3%. Delaware and Kentucky had none. Ibid. Can it be said that this
provision will have its greatest effect in States with the highest degree of
industrial development?
51 S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1958).
52 Ibid.
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